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Abstract
Consider a prediction market of multiple rounds with a security contingent on a certain
event whose final outcome is decided by the agents who also trade in the market. One such
prediction market is one in which two agents, Alice and Bob, are trading on the likelihood of
a project both are working on complete. Prior research either only considers the expected
rewards in the prediction market or if external incentives are present, then only a low
number of rounds in the prediction market, to our knowledge at most 2. In addition, the
existing literature assumes that when external incentives exist, there is no net difference
between the cost of different actions agents may take outside of the prediction market. For
example, it is the same cost for either Alice to work hard to complete the project as it is for
her to “loaf” and not work hard. In this work we consider a 2-round round setting in which
agents’ cost of external actions differ. We show that when external action costs differ but
are within a proper range, a prediction market is incentive compatible regardless of the
initial market estimate, something that currently is not shown in the existing literature.
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A prediction market is created to aggregate information from individuals about uncertain
events of interest. It is generally assumed that the agents who participate in the market
by trading may have superior information about the relevant event, but no direct control
over the outcome. However, prediction markets are often used in situations where this
assumption is violated [7]. In this study we consider the impact of external incentives on
the efficacy of prediction markets, especially when the external incentives require costly
actions. Prediction markets that are deployed in corporate settings consist of a market
maker, a center with whom all participants (agents) trade, that is present to facilitate
trade and boost market liquidity. In our study, the market maker, is also the market
participants’ employer, does not want agents to take undesirable actions at work that
impact the outcome of the traded event.
There is a mountain of evidence that prediction markets can help produce forecasts of
event outcomes with a lower prediction error than conventional forecast methods [1]. How-
ever, it is also possible that agents might bluff and deceive other players by not revealing
their true beliefs, hoping to correct the prediction probability and benefit from it later [8].
In addition to bluffing to maximize prediction market payoff, an agent may also change
her behavior outside of the prediction market to maximize her reward within the market
as well as outside of the market. For example, employees might have incentives to “slack
off” when working on a project just because their prediction market position is favorable
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to the project being delayed and would somehow benefit more in the prediction market
by working less hard in the workplace. Society is also worried that terrorists might have
a higher incentive to actually conduct attacks if they trade in a relevant prediction mar-
ket [16]. In reality, terrorist markets were shut down by congress in the United States of
America over these concerns. There are additional canonical real-world examples showing
that having agents trade in a prediction market distorts the same agents’ incentives within
and outside of the prediction market [6]. In fact, there is no ex post way to determine
how the presence of a prediction market changes agents’ probability estimates, without
considering the equilibrium strategies of agents within prediction markets. In this study,
we use equilibrium analysis to see if prediction market may indeed cause deviant agent
behavior when the actions of agents external to the market are costly.
In conducting equilibrium analysis with the presence of external incentives in prediction
markets, we find that when external actions have asymmetric costs, one costs more or
less than another, then these asymmetries may actually lead agents to behave truthfully.
Specifically, we determine the equilibrium strategies for two agents in a 2-round setting
where the agents trade in a prediction market with a final value contingent on an event
that the same two agents have a direct impact on the likelihood of the traded event. We
prove that the final equilibrium strategy shows that participants will always take desirable
actions/undesirable actions related to the project (work hard/loaf) and be truthful when
reporting in the prediction market, as they would have had the prediction market not
existed.
In the remainder of this document we introduce related work in Chapter 2 and define
our general model in Chapter 3. We next show that when the cost of exerting high effort is
positive, agents do not work hard, but are truthful in the prediction market in Section 4.2;
similarly we show that when the cost of exerting high effort is negative, agents work hard
and are sill truthful in the prediction market in Section 4.3. However, we show in Section 4.4
that when there is no cost for efforts, there is possibility that agents do not always work
hard and they do not report truthfully in the prediction market. In Chapter 5 we conclude




There has been a lot of research on prediction market with scoring rules that do not con-
sider outside incentives. [4] defines the quadratic scoring rule that assumes agents cannot
influence the outcome of the predicted event. [3] compares three commonly used strictly
proper scoring rules: quadratic, spherical and logarithmic scoring rules. [18] demonstrate
that different strictly proper scoring rules yield considerably different rankings of forecast-
ers based on their scoring rule scores. We, on the other hand, assume agents interact
in a market scoring rule market proposed by [14], derived from the difference of sequen-
tial scoring rules. Hanson’s market scoring rule (MSR) incentivizes risk-neutral, myopic
agents to truthfully reveal their probabilistic estimates by ensuring that truthful report-
ing/betting maximizes their expected payoffs (is incentive compatible). [10] implies that
market making can serve as an effective trading strategy for individual agents who do not
possess superior information but are willing to learn from prices. Unlike the work of [10],
we consider MSR prediction markets in which forward-looking agents may take costly ex-
ternal actions external of the market to influence the likelihood of the traded event. The
agents in our setting, are informed and do not simply learn from the traded prices.
It is generally assumed that the agents who participate in the market by trading may
have superior information about the relevant event, but no direct control over the outcome
as noted by [7]. However, prediction markets are often used in situations where this
assumption is violated to a greater or lesser degree, and we also assume agents may influence
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the outcome of the traded event and therefore have outside incentives similar to [6, 12, 15,
22]. [22] indicate a potential downside of prediction markets is that they may incentivize
agents to take undesirable actions, and prove that there exist principle-aligned prediction
mechanisms that do not incentivize undesirable actions with an ‘overpayment result’. In
particular, unlike our work, [22] does not use a market scoring rule mechanism, instead
uses sequential scoring rules, and has linear subsidy (in the number of agents). [6] give
a two-round example to understand when markets may be prone to manipulation due to
different outside incentives and how much to trust the resulting prediction probabilities.
However, [6] does not consider costly actions as our work do. [15] assumes profit-indifferent
manipulators and proposes a modification to market scoring rules in the form of trade
limits, in order to reduce the extent of manipulation of prediction markets due to external
incentives. However, the limitation of trade amounts may also interfere with enabling
agents’ true beliefs, a limitation we do not have in our work as we do not bound agents’
budgets. [9] employ a two-player market scoring rule setting where a manipulator with
outside incentives trade first, followed by a truthful trader. We also have the two-player
market setting but the two agents in our model are both strategic traders with outside
incentives. Unlike the papers cited in this paragraph, we show that when non-myopic
agents’ expected payoffs not only consist of payoffs from the prediction market, but also
include the costs of their related actions which decide the outcome of the market, the
quadratic scoring rule used as the market reward mechanism incentivize agents to report





In this section, we propose and describe our setting formally. In a company C, two em-
ployees are assigned to complete a time-limited project E together, and we call them Alice
and Bob. We consider each week as a round from the beginning of this project and the
scheduled time for conducting this project is T weeks. Because we are considering our
model in a multi-round setting, the number of rounds should be equal or larger than 2. In
every round, Alice and Bob will separately decide whether to give high, later denoted as
1, or low, later denoted as 0, effort to project E during this week. After T rounds, Alice
and Bob’s total efforts will determine the likelihood of the project’s success (e.g., meet its
scheduled delivery date). The project E has binary outcome as E occurs or E does not
occur. If the project succeeds by the end of T rounds, we say E occurs; if the project fails
by the end of T rounds, we say E does not occur. Also at the end of every round, every
high effort will bring some payoff scores (negative scores are equivalent to net costs of high
efforts and positive scores are equivalent to net rewards) that is a function of the effort in
that round to the player who exerted this effort, but low efforts will not bring any payoff
scores to the players. 1
1Payoff scores need not be linear in effort and the constant α is used to convert the functional form of
effort to payoff scores, in order to be compared with scores earned in the prediction market. When payoff
score is negative, high efforts bring net costs to agents; when payoff score is positive, high efforts bring net
rewards to agents. The total scores earned from exerting efforts and reporting in the prediction market
could be converted to some financial costs or rewards that will be given to the agents.
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At the same time, in a prediction market, Alice and Bob also trade in security F
whose ultimate value is contingent on the outcome of E. We assume that the prediction
market is a market scoring rule market. If there is no related prediction market in C, then
employees will be inspired to devote high efforts to E in order to gain maximal expected
payoffs. However, when a prediction market contingent on E exists, the employer may
worry that employees will change their effort levels in order to benefit more through the
rewards procured in the prediction market.
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In the previous sentence, r
(i)
A = 1 − r
(i)
A , in the remainder of this document we will
analogously define w = 1 − w for any variable w. In addition, s(·) is said to be a proper
scoring rule if for a risk-neutral agent with belief p and report r on an event, then:
d
dr




[p · s(r) + p · s(r)] ≤ 0. (3.2)
When an agent’s score maximizing report is equal to her true belief, a proper scoring
rule, and in turn a market scoring rule, is said to incentive compatible. Here we have the
assumption that Alice (Bob) would assume the other player to be myopic when she (he) sees
his (her) previous prediction in the market and we use νA (0 < νA < 1) to describe Alice’s
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is the belief on the likelihood of E’s final occurring held by Alice (Bob) in round i before she




B ) is the payoff score earned from the current
round i to the final round T by agent Alice (Bob) from exerting efforts to E and also from




B ) is the system stage that Alice (Bob)
has in round i after she (he) observes the most recent prediction probability and before
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B )]). Figure 3.1 shows the dynamics of our model. We
assume that in each round Alice first determines her effort level, e
(i)
A , then she makes a
report in the prediction market, r
(i)
A ; next, Bob determines the effort level he exerts in this
round, e
(i)
B , and finally the round concludes by Bob reporting in the prediction market, r
(i)
B .
However, for a certain round, one agent decides her (his) effort level and reported belief of
this round at the same time, though the actions exerted to the project and exerted in the
prediction market are conducted sequentially. Alice’s and Bob’s reports in the prediction
market are always common knowledge to both agents in all cases. Effort levels, however,























Figure 3.1: Model dynamics timeline
Given that in each round two risk-neutral forward-looking agents are maximizing their
expected profits from the current round to the end of the project horizon, T , we can write
down the Bellman equation to determine the payoff for each round for each agent. Before
we write down the equations fo each round, we first define the payoffs each agent will receive










































B ) in the prediction market, with each
probability estimate bounded between 0 and 1. As previously introduced, the value of








B )), is negative when high efforts bring
net costs and positive when high efforts bring net rewards. In our model we assume that
the likelihood of E occurring is determined by the total number of high efforts of all rounds,
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For Alice in round i before she takes any actions in this round, the number of accu-
mulated high efforts exerted by her and by the end of round i − 1 (h(i−1)A ) is known to
herself, but the number of accumulated high efforts exerted by Bob and by the end of











future efforts, and e
(i)
A is the effort level decision she needs to make in this current round
i. For agent Bob before he takes any actions in round i, the situation is slightly different.
Because Alice has already taken her actions in this round, the number of accumulated high
efforts exerted by her is h
(i)


















































In equation (3.4a) we see the formal definition of p
(i)
















all weighted by νA. From Alice’s perspective, she knows her past effort levels, thus h
(i−1)
A
is known and is some natural number between 0 and i − 1. Similarly, as we will see in
our analysis, Alice may infer Bob’s effort levels from his reports in the prediction market,
and again h
(i−1)




B effort values, for n ≥ i + 1, are not
necessarily binary, and are instead real numbers over [0, 1] to account for the fact that
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Alice’s and Bob’s equilibrium effort strategies are mixed. As effort levels are not common
knowledge, we have to define how each agent interprets the reported probability of the
other agent. One way to interpret reported probabilities is to use Bayesian updating, given
current prior beliefs. However, as the probability of E is dependent not only on market
estimates but current and future effort levels, defining the Bayesian updating policy is
quite convoluted. To simplify our analysis, we define rB(A)
(i) as Bob’s estimate on the
likelihood of E up to and including round i after observing Alice’s last report. However,
when Alice makes the report in round i, Bob has not yet taken actions in this round, the
expectation of his effort value of round i perceived by Alice is denoted as EA(ẽ(i)B ). We
similarly define rA(B)
(i) as Alice’s estimate of the likelihood of E’s occurring up to and






















Here we assume that at the beginning of round i, Alice has no information of predicting
Bob’s effort level of this round, which implies EA(ẽ(i)B ) = 0.5 for any round i. Then the
notations of rB(A)
(i) and rA(B)

























B , as we are simply presenting how each of the
agents interprets the observed prediction market probabilities of the other agent. In (3.4a)
Alice’s number of previous high efforts, h
(i−1)
A , is known to herself; and the number of Bob’s
previous high efforts, h
(i−1)
B , could not be observed directly but could be inferred using his









. For (3.4b) the unobservable
























into (3.4a) and (3.4b) separately, we can get a further expression of the agents’ beliefs on





































With the payoff scores collected in each round, each agent maximizes the current round’s









































































This section first introduces one of the most commonly used scoring rules, the quadratic
scoring rule, that will be used in all following cases. Then we give mathematical analysis
of case 1, high efforts bring net cost to agents, and case 2, high efforts bring net reward
instead and case 3, external incentives do not exist. We assume T = 2 for all cases.
In this work, we show that with external incentives (net payoff scores are given to ex-
erted efforts), the quadratic scoring applied in the prediction market is incentive-compatible
(agents will report truthfully in the prediction market). In fact, we prove that in a 2-round
setting, agents will take desirable actions (always exert high efforts) when high efforts bring
net rewards in case 1; and agents will take undesirable actions (always exert low efforts)
when high efforts bring net costs in case 2. When external incentives exist, agents will
behave as if the prediction market were not present, which indicates that the prediction
market will not change agents’ incentives outside of the market. However, when external
incentive does not exist, we prove in case 3 that agents will have incentives to bluff (report
untruthfully) in the prediction market when they are forward-looking. This result is aligned
with the conclusion from previous work [8, 11].
11
4.1 Application of the quadratic scoring rule
In this section, we use one of the most popular scoring rules, the quadratic scoring rule,
as the reward mechanism in the prediction market. As we consider extreme reports in our
results, we cannot use another, perhaps more popular, scoring rule, the logarithmic scoring
rule. Then s(E, r) introduced in Chapter 3 is defined as:
s(E, r) = 2r − r2 − r2 = −2r2 + 4r − 1
s(E, r) = 2r − r2 − r2 = −2r2 + 1
(4.1)
s(E, r) is a proper scoring rule as (3.1) and (3.2) are satisfied. We have already defined
the scores earned by reporting in the prediction market in Chapter 3 as:
ρs(r
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(i)





A ) = s(E, r
(i)





B ) = s(E, r
(i)





B ) = s(E, r
(i)




Using s(E, r) defined in (4.1), we can further write the scores as:
ρs(r
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4.2 Case 1: High efforts bring net costs to agents
In case 1 we assume that two agents’ efforts together decide the outcome of E and the
ultimate value of F but high efforts will bring net costs to the agents who exert them. In
this setting, we assume the payoff function of exerted efforts to be ρe(e) = −α · e2 (α > 0):
ρe(e
(i)











In this section we use the definition of Alice’s (Bob’s) belief on the likelihood E’s final
occurrence in each round when maximizing her (his) expected total payoff from Chapter 3,
and apply the quadratic scoring rule introduced in section 4.1. From (4.4), (3.7) and (4.3),



















B )], respectively. After inserting the payoff functions of exerted efforts (4.4),
the belief on the likelihood of E’s occurring (3.7), and the payoff functions in the prediction
market (4.3) into the maximization equations (3.8) from the first round to the final round,
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2 (4.6b)
+












From the timeline we know that Alice is the first agent to make action decisions in








B are values for future actions,
which are not known to Alice now, but could be inferred by her, for agents are assumed
to be rational, forward-looking and strategic in our model. To be more specific, Alice can
play the whole game in her mind knowing that both agents want to maximize the expected
scores earned from the current round to the final round in any round, and infer what
future optimal actions will be after exerting effort e
(1)
A and making report r
(1)
A in round 1.
Following this logic, we can use backwards induction to solve this problem, i.e., determine





A ) as the function of Bob’s (Alice’s) expected payoff scores earned from




A ) is the corresponding optimal function value. First
consider agent Bob in round 2, there is no future score for Bob since this is the last round,
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2 + (1− νA)r(2)A .
Proof. As we can see from the equation above, f
(2)
B is a function of Alice’s most recent
report (r
(2)
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B )) and the optimal function value (f
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need to check the convexity of the function f
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In fact, when α >
ν2A
2
, we can prove that f
(2)
A (which could be similarly defined as
f
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}, then the range of scores
earned from efforts in each round is between [0, 1
2
), while the range of scores earned from
reports in each round is between [0, 2]. Under this assumption we find f
(2)
B to be a concave
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A − 1)2
0 0 −2(r(2)A )2 + (1− νA)r
(2)
A
0 1 −2(r(2)A )2 + (5− νA)r
(2)
A + νA − 3
1 0 −2(r(2)A )2 + (νA − 1)r
(2)
A − α
1 1 −2(r(2)A )2 + (νA + 3)r
(2)
A − α− νA − 1
Table 4.1: KKT points of f
(2)
B in case 1
when α > (1−νA)
2
2
, and it is not a feasible solution for the value of e
(2)
B is between [0, 1]. In
this situation, the way to find the maximal value f
(2)∗
B is to find its Karush–Kuhn–Tucker
(KKT) points and compare the values of f
(2)
B of these points, for f
(2)∗
B must be attained
in one of these KKT points. We write down in table 4.1 the KKT points of f
(2)
B and the
corresponding function values. However, to simplify our analysis, unfeasible KKT points





(1− νA), by comparing the values of f (2)B of feasible
KKT points in table 4.1, we find that f
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j,i ], and f
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j,i to denote
the equilibrium decisions, total expected payoff (from round k to the last round), and
round payoff, of player j, j ∈ {A,B} in round k according to the conditions of lemma i,
respectively.

























Proof. Similar as the proof for lemma 1, if 1
4
(1 − νA) 6 r(2)A , by comparing the values of
f
(2)
B of feasible KKT points in table 4.1, we find that f
(2)∗

















(νA − 1)). So lemma 2 is true.
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Given the two cases for Bob’s equilibrium decisions in round 2, we may now determine
Bob’s round 2 decisions:
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Proof. With lemma 1 and lemma 2, theorem 1 is true.
Then consider Alice’s expected payoff score in round i = 2. We know from theorem 1
that e
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B = 0 no matter what value r
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1 0 −2νAr(1)B − α
1 1 2(1− νA)(r(1)B − 1)− α
Table 4.2: KKT points of f
(2)
A in case 1
We find that f
(2)
A is a concave function because the value of the first principle minor
of ∇2f (2)A is negative as −2α < 0, and the value of the second principle minor of ∇2f
(2)
A
is positive as when α >
ν2A
2















. However, it is not a feasible solution when r
(1)
B 6= 0, so we still need to discuss
the KKT points of f
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A . We denote in table 4.2 the KKT
points of f
(2)
B and the corresponding function values. However, to simplify our analysis,
unfeasible KKT points are not shown in this table.
By comparing the values of f
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A in table 4.2, we find that f
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B . Together with the statement
of theorem 1, we infer lemma 3.
We now move to Bob’s optimal actions in the first round. We find that Bob will exert
low effort and report as 0 in round 1 no matter what report Alice makes in round 1.
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Table 4.3: KKT points of f
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B + δ · f
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B,2 in case 1 when
1
2
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where f
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B + δ · f
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(νA − 1)), which is larger than r(1)A (1 − νA); however, when
0 < νA <
1
3
, this situation does not exist for r
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(1 − νA), the rest
three points’ values are all less than r
(1)
A (1− νA).

















B ) = (0, 0). So theorem 3 is true.
At last, consider Alice in round 1. We have already proved in theorem 1, theorem 2
















2 = 0 no matter
what effort Alice exerts and no matter what report she makes in round 1. In this situation
f
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We now move to Alice’s optimal actions in the first round. We find that Alice will exert
low effort and report as 0 in round 1 no matter what initial market estimate is.































































1 1 −α− 2νAr(0)B + 2(r
(0)
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Table 4.4: KKT points of f
(1)
A + δ · f
(2)∗
A in case 1
Proof. We write down the KKT points of the concave function f
(1)
A + δ · f
(2)∗
A in table 4.4.
By comparing the function values of the KKT points in table 4.4, we immediately conclude
that the optimal value of f
(1)
A + δ · f
(2)∗







A ) = (0, 0).
So theorem 4 is true.
From theorem 4, theorem 3, theorem 2, and theorem 1, we infer the set of equilibrium
strategies for both agents of 2 rounds in table 4.5:









A = (0, 0)
1 B a
(1)∗
B = (0, 0)
2 A a
(2)∗
A = (0, 0)
2 B a
(2)∗
B = (0, 0)
Table 4.5: Equilibrium strategies in case 1
And we have table 4.6 of equilibrium payoffs in case 1:






} and 0 < νA < 13 , then not
only will all of the agents’ reports be 0, but so will all of their effort values. This suggests
that even when agents are strategic and external incentives exist, the proposed market
scoring rule is incentive compatible regardless of the initial market estimate, so long as we
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Round, i Player, j Optimal expected payoff, E[π
(i)∗
j ()]








1 B E[π(1)∗B (r
(1)∗
A = 0, a
(1)
B )] = 0
2 A E[π(2)∗A (r
(1)∗
B = 0, a
(2)
A )] = 0
2 B E[π(2)∗B (r
(2)∗
A = 0, a
(2)
B )] = 0
Table 4.6: Equilibrium payoffs in case 1
set a proper range for α and νA. In the next section we derive the symmetric result when
the cost of high effort is negative.
4.3 Case 2: High efforts bring net rewards to agents
In case 2 we assume that two agents’ efforts together decide the outcome of E and the
ultimate value of F but high efforts will bring negative net costs (equivalent to positive net
rewards) to the agents who exert them. We further assume the payoff function of exerted
effort to be ρe(e) = α · e2(α > 0):
ρe(e
(i)

















In this section we set Alice’s impact on deciding the likelihood of E as νA ∈ (0, 1) and
have the same definition of Alice’s (Bob’s) belief on the likelihood of E’s final occurring
held in each round as that of case 1. Here we continue using the quadratic scoring rule








A as in case 1.
After inserting the reward functions of exerted efforts (4.10), the belief on the likelihood
of E’s occurring (3.7) perceived by agents, and the reward functions in the prediction
market (4.3) into the maximization equations (3.8) for Alice and Bob separately, we get























































{α · (e(2)A )
2 (4.11b)
+
1 · r(1)B + νA · e
(2)




































A − 0.5(1− νA) + νA · ẽ
(2)






· [4r(1)B − 4r
(1)



















{α · (e(2)B )
2 +





· [4r(2)B − 4r
(2)







When i = 2, there are no future rounds. Consider Bob’s function of expected payoff
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Proof. Because Bob is the last agent to take actions in round 2, there are no future action
values that need to be inserted into the equation of f
(2)
B . To determine the optimal value of
f
(2)
B and the optimal action set a
(2)
B for a given report r
(2)
A , we need to check the convexity
of the function f
(2)
























































= 2α > 0 . the

































 = −8α− 4(1− νA)2 < 0.
We find that the Hessian of f
(2)
B is an indefinite matrix so we still need to find its
KKT points and compare the corresponding values of f
(2)
B , for f
(2)∗





































0 0 −2(r(2)A )2 + (1− νA)r
(2)
A
0 1 −2(r(2)A )2 + (5− νA)r
(2)
A + νA − 3
1 0 −2(r(2)A )2 + (νA − 1)r
(2)
A + α
1 1 −2(r(2)A )2 + (νA + 3)r
(2)
A + α− νA − 1
Table 4.7: KKT points of f
(2)
B in case 2
one of these KKT points. We write down in table 4.7 the KKT points of f
(2)
B and the
corresponding function values. However, to simplify our analysis, unfeasible KKT points






















(1− νA)). So lemma 4 is true.


















B )] = −2(r
(2)
A )
2 + (νA + 3)r
(2)
A + α− νA − 1.





, by comparing the values of f
(2)
B of
feasible KKT points in table 4.6, we find that f
(2)∗





2 + (νA +
3)r
(2)




B,5 ) = (1, 1). So lemma 5 is true.
Given the two cases for Bob’s equilibrium decisions in round 2, we may now determine
Bob’s round 2 decisions:


















(1− νA)) if 0 6 r(2)A 6
3+νA
4
(1, 1) if 3+νA
4














−2(r(2)A )2 + (νA + 3)r
(2)
A + α− νA − 1 if
3+νA
4
6 r(2)A 6 1
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Proof. With lemma 4 and lemma 5, theorem 5 is true.
Then consider Alice in round i = 2 when the only future effort is ẽ
(2)
B . We know from




B = 1. After inserting ẽ
(2)




















(2− 1) · r(1)B + νA · e
(2)
A + (1− νA) · 1
2









We now move to Alice’s optimal actions in round 2. We find that Alice will exert high
effort and report as 1 in round 2 no matter what Bob reports in round 1.




























Proof. To find the value of f
(2)∗















































We find that the Hessian of f
(2)
A is also an indefinite matrix because the value of its
first principle minor is positive as 2α > 0, and the value of its second principle minor is
negative as −8α− 4(νA)2 < 0. We write down in table 4.8 the KKT points of f (2)A and the
corresponding function values. We find that f
(2)









































































1 0 −2r(1)B + α
1 1 α
Table 4.8: KKT points of f
(2)
A in case 2




















































(1− νA)) if 0 6 r(1)B 6 12(1 + νA)
(1, 1) if 1
2































B νA − 12νA + α if
1
2
(1 + νA) 6 r
(1)
B 6 1







B + 1). Together with the
statement of theorem 5, we infer lemma 6.

































A −3 +νA) +α+ 18ν
(2)
































A − 1− νA) + 18(ν
(1)
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A − 3 + νA) + α + 18ν
(2)
A − 34νA +
9
8

























A (νA − 3) + α + δ(α + 18(ν
(1)
A − 1)2)
Table 4.9: KKT points of f
(1)
B + δ · f
(2)∗






Proof. From lemma 6 we know that f
(2)∗
B is attained as f
(2)∗
































We first discuss the situation where f
(2)∗













(1 + νA). Similarly we denote the KKT points of f
(1)
B + δ · f
(2)∗
B,4 in table 4.9.







B + δ · f
(2)∗












A − 34νA +
9
8
























We secondly discuss the situation where f
(2)∗






















(1 + νA). Using the same method, we find
that f
(1)
B + δ · f
(2)∗
B,5 is maximized as (1 − νA)(1 − r
(1)










































A − 3 + νA) + α + 18ν
(2)
A − 34νA +
9
8

















(3− νA)). So lemma 7 is true.


















B )] = (1− νA)(1− r
(1)























−νA) when (e(1)∗B,8 , r
(1)∗
B,8 ) =
(1, 1). So lemma 8 is true.
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Given the two cases for Bob’s equilibrium decisions in round 1, we may now determine
Bob’s round 1 decisions:




















(3− νA)) if 0 6 r(1)A 6
νA+1
2
(1, 1) if νA+1
2











A − 3 + νA) + α + 18ν
(2)
A − 34νA +
9
8









(1− νA)(1− r(1)A ) + α(1 + δ) + δνA(12 − νA) if
νA+1
2
6 r(1)A 6 1
Proof. With lemma 7 and lemma 8, theorem 7 is true.
Finally, consider Alice in round 1. We have already proved in theorem 5, theorem 6







































A )], we get


























A + 1) + (1− νA)(1 + 1)
2









We now move to Alice’s optimal actions in the first round. We find that Alice will exert
high effort and report as 1 in round 1 no matter what initial market estimate is.
















A )] = 2(r
(0)
B − 1)2 + (1 + δ)α.



















is achieved as 2(r
(0)

























2 + 2(1− νA)− 4r(0)B + δα
1 1 2(r
(0)






















B + νA − 2) + 2(1− νA) + δα




A in case 2
From theorem 8, theorem 7, theorem 6, and theorem 5, we infer the set of optimal
equilibrium strategies for both agents of 2 rounds in table 4.11:









A = (1, 1)
1 B a
(1)∗
B = (1, 1)
2 A a
(2)∗
A = (1, 1)
2 B a
(2)∗
B = (1, 1)
Table 4.11: Equilibrium strategies in case 2
And we also have the equilibrium payoffs in table 4.12:
Round, i Player, j Optimal expected payoff, E[π
(i)∗
j ()]




A ] = 2(r
(0)
B − 1)2 + (1 + δ)α












A )] = α




B )] = α
Table 4.12: Equilibrium payoffs in case 2






}, then not only will all of
the agents’ reports be 1, but so will all of their effort values.
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The results in sections 4.2 and 4.3 generalize to the 4 round setting, but it is still unclear
if they generalize for any value of T . The analysis required for the generalized 4 round
setting is similar to the 2 round setting, and as such we omit it from this document.
4.4 Case 3: External incentives do not exist
In case 3 we assume that two agents’ efforts together decide the outcome of E and
the ultimate value of F but their efforts will bring no payoffs to the agents who exert
them (ρe(e) = 0). Previous work has shown that when external incentives do not exist
outside of the prediction market, non-myopic agents have incentives to lie in the prediction
market. We show in case 3 that this result also applies for our model. Without losing gen-
erality, we assume νA =
1
2
(Alice and Bob have the same impact on deciding the occurring





(the initial market estimate is set to be 3
4
). Under the above

































· [4r(1)A − 4r
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B + νA · ẽ
(2)





· [4r(2)A − 4r
(1)





























A − 0.5(1− νA) + νA · ẽ
(2)







· [4r(1)B − 4r
(1)


























· [4r(2)B − 4r
(2)







Using backwards induction as has been explained in detail for case 1 and case 2, we
infer the set of equilibrium strategies for both agents of 2 rounds in table 4.13:































Table 4.13: Equilibrium strategies in case 3
And we denote the equilibrium payoffs in table 4.14:
So in case 3 where external incentives do not exist, we observe directly from the optimal
actions that agents do not necessarily exert high efforts to E and they also do not report
truthfully in the prediction market.
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Round, i Player, j Optimal expected payoff, E[π
(i)∗
j ()]
















































In this work we show that with costly actions that determine the outcome of a prediction
market traded event, the promised costs or rewards of external actions actually have a
great influence on changing agents’ behaviour than potential prediction market benefits.
We find that in a 2-round setting, when agents are forward-looking and want to maximize
their total expected payoffs gained from exerting efforts towards realizing the traded event
as well as from trading in the prediction market, asymmetric action costs results in agents
avoiding taking the costliest actions. However if a market maker rewards her preferred
action the most, agents will take the desired action. We find that the value of net reward
to each desirable action should be larger than a certain amount, which is determined by
the value of νA in our 2-round setting. Perhaps unexpectedly, even though agents’ actions
are influenced by external costs, agents will always report truthfully during each prediction
market round, so long as we set a proper range of scores given to the related actions. This
observation, shows that our proper scoring rule is incentive-compatible even with external
incentives and costly actions.
In the past, decision and policy makers have expressed concern that the existence of a
prediction market will inspire undesirable actions for the agents who trade in the prediction
market and also have a direct impact on deciding the likelihood of the predicted event.
However, previous research does not take into account the potential payoffs (could be net
costs or net rewards) to the agents who exert such actions. We base our research on the
34
assumption that forward-looking agents wish to maximize their total expected payoffs not
only from the prediction market but also from their actions related to the traded event.
With our finding, a market maker who cares about the result of such predicted event can
in fact inspire agents’ desirable actions by rewarding preferred actions. A market maker
can also gain true information about agents’ actions from agents’ reports in the prediction
market for the market reward mechanism is incentive-compatible.
In this work we set a range for expected payoff scores of exerted efforts, whose absolute
value should be larger than a certain value in each round, in order to inspire certain
actions and truthful reports. We do not discuss whether the prediction market will still be
incentive-compatible or not when this range is violated. However, we do show that when
efforts are not costly actions (payoff scores are 0 for exerted efforts), agents will bluff in
the prediction market. More importantly, in this work we set the number of rounds (T ) to
be 2, which guarantees our assumption that agents are forward-looking. However, we do
have the need to extend our model to a finite round setting with T being a large number
to see whether our conclusion still holds if agents take actions and trade in the long run.
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APPENDICES
α constant that represents amount of cost (reward) for efforts, we assume 0 < α 6 2.
i number of round, i = 1, . . . , T .
r
(i)
A the reported prediction probability of E’s occurring in round i if the report has
already been made by Alice, r
(i)
A ∈ [0, 1], r
(i)





B the reported prediction probability of E’s occurring in round i if the report has
already been made by Bob, r
(i)
B ∈ [0, 1], r
(i)





A the reported prediction probability of E’s occurring in round i if the report has not
yet been made by Alice.
r̃
(i)
B the reported prediction probability of E’s occurring in round i if the report has not
yet been made by Bob.
r
(0)
B the beginning market estimate set in the prediction market by the market maker.
e
(i)
A value of Alice’s effort in round i if the effort action has already happened, e
(1)
A = 1 if
Alice devotes high effort in round i, otherwise 0, e
(i)





B value of Bob’s effort in round i if the effort action has already happened, e
(1)
B = 1 if
Bob devotes high effort in round i, otherwise 0, e
(i)





A value of Alice’s future effort in round i if the effort action has not yet taken place.
ẽ
(i)
B value of Bob’s future effort in round i if the effort action has not yet taken place.
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EA(ẽ(i)B ) the expectation of Bob’s future effort value of round i perceived by Alice when she
reports in round i.
a
(i)
















aA the policy that Alice takes for all rounds, aA := (a
(1)
A , ..., a
(T )
A ).




A , ..., a
(T )∗
A ).





AA the whole action set that Alice has, AA = A(1)A × ...×A
(i)
A and aA ∈ AA.
a
(i)
















aB the policy that Bob takes for all rounds, aB := (a
(1)
B , . . . , a
(T )
B ).




B , . . . , a
(T )∗
B ).





AB the whole action set that Bob has, AB = A(1)B × ...×A
(i)
B and aB ∈ AB.
h
(i)





B number of high efforts Bob has exerted in total from round 1 to round i, h
(0)
B = 0.
νA Alice’s impact on deciding the likelihood of project E’s occurring, 0 < νA < 1.
p
(i)
A Alice’s belief on the likelihood of E’s occurring in round i after she observes Bob’s
most recent report and before she takes any actions in that round, taking into account
actions in future rounds.
p
(i)
B Bob’s belief on the likelihood of E’s occurring in round i after he observes Alice’s
most recent report and before he takes any actions in that round, taking into account




e (·) function of payoff scores of efforts devoted in round i.
ρ
(i)
s (·) function of payoff scores earned from moving the probability in prediction market in
round i if E occurs (succeeds) after T rounds.
ρ
(i)
f (·) function of payoff scores earned from moving the probability in prediction market in
round i if E does not occur (fails) after T rounds.
δ discounting factor on the future profits, 0 < δ < 1.
π
(i)
A payoff scores earned by Alice from round i to round T , including scores earned in
this round and discounting future scores.
π
(i)
B payoff scores earned by Bob from round i to round T , including scores earned in this
round and discounting future scores.
I
(i)
A the system state that Alice has in round i, after she observes Bob’s most recent





A ) ] the expected value of π
(i)
A if the current state is I
(i)








A ) ] the optimal expected value of π
(i)





B the system state that Bob has in round i, after he observes Alice’s most recent report





B ) ] the expected value of π
(i)
B given if the current state is I
(i)
B and the current round’s







B ) ] the optimal expected value of π
(i)
B given the current state I
(i)
B .
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